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Paying Unpayable Debts: Juvenile 
Restitution and Its Shortcomings in 
Hennepin County, Minnesota 
Anwen Parrott† 
Introduction 
A few weeks before the end of his freshman year in high school, 
Adam1 met up with a group of his friends at a park near his home. 
As a fourteen-year-old growing up in a small suburban town outside 
of the Twin Cities, Adam felt insulated by the rules his parents set 
and the lack of freedom that he had. He was antsy for the end of the 
school year and bored by his daily routine. Most significantly, 
however, he was fourteen and impulsive, so when a friend noticed 
that the park’s groundskeeper had neglected to return a crowbar 
and an axe to the small groundskeeping shed where the tools were 
stored, Adam joined his friends in picking up and examining the 
forgotten tools. Adam began playfully swinging the crowbar and, 
before long, he and his friends were hitting a park bench and the 
shed with the tools, damaging both. The police promptly arrived and 
arrested Adam, who was later charged with criminal damage to 
property and ordered to pay over $10,000 to the city.2 Adam did not 
have a job. His parents lived paycheck to paycheck and were unable 
to contribute anything beyond a few dollars to his monthly 
restitution payment. They shared this information with the court, 
hoping that the restitution order would be reduced, yet the order 
stood in full. 
For Adam and other youth in his position, the journey towards 
making restitution often continues long after a court orders it. 
 
 †. J.D. Candidate 2021, University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to Grace 
O’Meara and Professor JaneAnne Murray for their guidance during the writing 
process, and to the Hennepin County public defenders who introduced me to the 
inequities in our juvenile restitution system. 
 1. The facts of Adam’s case are based upon those of In re Welfare of I.N.A., 902 
N.W.2d 635 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017), though a few details are embellished or changed, 
including the Defendant’s name, to protect identity. 
 2. In Hennepin County, juveniles and adults alike can be held jointly and 
severally liable for restitution. See State v. Johnson, 851 N.W.2d 60, 66 (Minn. 2014). 
In Adam’s case, as in many cases resulting in a restitution order, it did not matter 
how much damage he individually contributed to, for he was on the hook for the 
whole amount. Id. 
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Unpaid restitution orders begin accumulating interest—and, if still 
unpaid by the age of eighteen, transition into a civil judgment.3 As 
such, restitution orders pinned upon juveniles can follow these 
individuals into adulthood. Unpaid restitution orders seep into 
choices about whether to pursue post-secondary education or to 
forego college to pay down an accumulating debt. When money gets 
tight, tense calculations about whether to pay an electric bill, rent, 
or restitution follow.4 In other cases, the restitution order is simply 
ignored—but with this approach, too, come the consequences of 
debt, civil judgments, and probation violations for failure to comply 
with the restitution order.5 
Adam’s story is not unusual. Throughout Hennepin County 
and the state of Minnesota at large, courts order justice-involved 
youth6 to pay restitution in amounts that, given the children’s 
financial situations, are quite literally unpayable. A child too young 
to legally work was ordered to pay over $3,000 after hitting a car 
with his skateboard.7 A sixteen-year-old was required to pay nearly 
$2,000 in restitution after participating in a fight that landed him 
in the hospital, despite the fact that both he and his mother were 
unemployed or underemployed.8 
 
 3. Restitution, HENNEPIN CNTY. ATT’Y’S OFF., https://www.hennepin 
attorney.org/cases/adult-felonies/restitution [perma.cc/WL5P-G6YZ]. If a defendant 
does not begin payment within sixty days, the restitution they owe may be entered 
as a civil judgment and/or referred to the Minnesota Department of Revenue, where 
a “collection fee of up to 25%” is added to their outstanding restitution. Id. The 
Department of Revenue may “levy (take) property and assets,” such as wages, tax 
refunds, and bank accounts to cover the unpaid debts, and can even revoke 
professional licenses—seemingly complicating payment even further. Id. 
 4. The impacts of restitution on individuals living in poverty is extreme. 
Restitution orders received while still in the juvenile system strain a family to the 
point of homelessness. See Eli Hager, Punishing Kids with Years of Debt, THE 
MARSHALL PROJECT (June 11, 2019), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/ 
06/11/punishing-kids-with-years-of-debt [perma.cc/UJ35-34RJ]. 
 5. MINN. STAT. § 260b.198(8). 
 6. The term “justice-involved youth” describes children accused of committing a 
delinquent or criminal act. See Precious Skinner-Osei, Laura Mangan, Mara Liggett, 
Michelle Kerrigan & Jill S. Levinson, Justice-Involved Youth and Trauma-Informed 
Interventions, JUST. POL’Y J., Fall 2019, at 2. Occasionally, the term is viewed more 
narrowly, to incorporate only the population of youth incarcerated in juvenile or 
adult facilities. See Justice Involved Youth, AM. YOUTH POL’Y F., 
https://www.aypf.org/youth-populations/juvenile-justice/ [perma.cc/44U5-BSBR]. 
This Note incorporates the broader meaning of the word. 
 7. In re Welfare of L.F.M., No. A13-0541, 2013 WL 5778221, at *3 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Oct. 28, 2013). 
 8. In re Welfare of N.A.B., No. A13-0270, 2013 WL 5676920, at *1–2 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Oct. 21, 2013) (finding the district court sufficiently considered N.A.B.’s ability 
to pay restitution and affirming the restitution order to pay $1,763.90 in spite of his 
mother’s statement that she “[doesn’t] make any money”). 
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While these virtually unpayable orders are handed down in 
district courts, burdening children and teenagers with debts that 
loom larger over time (quite literally, due to the interest or 
collections costs that attach to unpaid court fines), without a 
significant increase in ability to pay even as these children 
transition into adulthood, restitution programs are nationally 
lauded for their capacity to make a victim “whole” while holding the 
responsible party personally accountable.9 Scholars have focused 
particular attention on the positive impact that restitution might 
wield in the juvenile court system, theorizing that restitution aids 
in the rehabilitation that courts have increasingly identified10 as 
the goal of juvenile court.11 Yet this literature routinely overlooks a 
practical reality: restitution programs are not likely to have a 
positive impact on children and teenagers required to pay more 
money than they (or their immediate and extended families) can 
afford to pay. What’s more, when judges set restitution without 
regard for an individual’s ability to pay, these orders are unlikely to 
provide financial support to victims of a crime, thus injuring the 
parties restitution was intended to uplift.12 
 
 9. Stacy Hoskins Haynes, Alison C. Cares & R. Barry Ruback, Juvenile 
Economic Sanctions: An Analysis of Their Imposition, Payment, and Effect on 
Recidivism, 13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 31, 36, 51 (2014). 
 10. For an overview of the United States Supreme Court’s recognition of a 
rehabilitative framework in juvenile law (prior to Jones v. Mississippi, No. 18-1259, 
slip op. R-30 (Apr. 22, 2021)), see generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) 
(finding the death penalty a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
when given to offenders who committed their crimes when they were under 18 years 
old), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (finding a sentence of lifetime 
incarceration without parole is a violation of the Eighth Amendment when given to 
juveniles), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016) (finding that 
offenders who committed their crimes as juveniles must be given the opportunity to 
demonstrate that their crime did not indicate “irreparable corruption”). The Roper 
and Miller line of cases rely on juvenile brain science and societal values to conclude 
that juveniles are “categorically less culpable than the average criminal,” Roper, 542 
U.S. at 552 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)), and that the 
“penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, 
even when they commit terrible crimes” are thus diminished. Miller, 567 U.S. at 472. 
Punishment accorded to juveniles, the Court reasoned, must allow some meaningful 
opportunity for release based upon demonstrated growth and rehabilitation. Id. at 
479. But see Jones v. Mississippi, no. 18-1259, slip op. R-30 (Apr. 22, 2021) (finding 
that a sentencer does not need to make any official finding of “permanent 
incorrigibility” before sentencing a juvenile to life without parole).  
 11. Haynes et al., supra note 9, at 35. 
 12. Numerous studies tracking restitution orders suggest that this type of court-
ordered payment largely goes unpaid. One study tracking payments of a subsample 
of individuals with felony-level offenses found that nearly 77% of the restitution they 
had been assessed went unpaid. Alexes Harris, Heather Evans & Katherine Beckett, 
Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary 
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This Note will examine the history of juvenile restitution, 
focusing specifically on its historical and current practice within 
Hennepin County in Minnesota.13 It will argue that Hennepin 
County’s juvenile restitution program potentially harms, rather 
than rehabilitates, justice-involved youth and, in response, it 
advocates for a shift in statutory interpretation to take seriously the 
financial needs and limitations of youth. This Note also argues that 
despite being classified alongside “restorative justice” programs, 
restitution, as currently implemented, is more punitive than 
restorative for low-income individuals and thus does not align with 
the rehabilitative purpose of juvenile court. In Part I, this Note 
explores the historical use of restitution in criminal courts 
throughout the United States, the implementation of restitution 
programs in both adult and juvenile courts in Minnesota, and the 
widespread celebration of the practice that arises in scholarship 
about restitution (despite its inconclusive success rates). In Part II, 
this Note emphasizes the importance of restorative justice and 
rehabilitation, particularly in the lives of youth, and argues that the 
restitution program in Hennepin County, on the whole, fails to 
serve a restorative or rehabilitative purpose. Finally, Part III of this 
Note considers solutions. It advocates for changes to the 
interpretation of Minnesota Statutes Sections 260b.198 and 
611A.045 to encourage courts to more fully consider a juvenile’s 
ability to pay restitution, and urges the restitution juveniles face be 
“reasonable.” This Note also considers creative solutions, including 
the enactment of a county-wide restitution fund to compensate 
victims when a juvenile defendant cannot afford to pay, and 
proposes some alternative approaches that could more successfully 
consider and repair the harm caused by youth adjudicated 
delinquent. 
 
United States, 115 AM. J. SOCIO. 1753, 1774 (2010). Unfortunately, these unpaid 
restitution orders disproportionately impact poor communities. R. Barry Ruback, 
The Benefits and Costs of Economic Sanctions: Considering the Victim, the Offender, 
and Society, 269 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1788 (2015) (“The problems usually faced by 
offenders are also faced by victims—they are disproportionately poor, unemployed, 
unskilled, and racial/ethnic minorities.”). 
 13. Restitution programs vary remarkably from state to state. While much of 
what is discussed within this Note is relevant on a national scale, solutions should 
be tailored to individual states, counties, or even cities. 
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I. Background: What Is Restitution and Why Do We Use 
It? 
A. Defining Restitution and Understanding Its Growing 
Popularity 
Like other court fines and fees, restitution is a payment 
ordered upon the trial court’s discretion after a defendant is 
convicted of a crime—or, in the case of a juvenile defendant, after 
they have been adjudicated delinquent by the court.14 Unlike fines 
and fees that are somewhat standardized,15 restitution is a payment 
from a defendant to the victim of the crime to compensate for the 
unique harm caused by their wrongful acts.16 Restitution orders 
vary dramatically, as courts discretionarily order monetary 
restitution for the tangible harm sustained in a given incident17—
which may broadly include damage to property, medical or therapy 
bills, or funeral costs.18 Legal scholars and social scientists alike 
have opined about the transformative impact that restitution can 
have, theorizing that restitution orders force defendants to not only 
reimburse victims for the direct harm that they created, but also to 
reckon with the full magnitude of loss that they caused, in both 
monetary and philosophical terms.19 
While the concept of restitution and the notions of 
accountability embedded within it (i.e., that a responsible party 
compensates an innocent party for an injury or loss that they 
caused) have ancient roots,20 court systems in the United States did 
 
 14. MINN. STAT. § 611A.04(1); Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines 
Clause, 102 CAL. L. REV. 2 (2014); Steven H. David & Cale J. Bradford, Crime Does 
Not Pay: Understanding Criminal Debt, 50 IND. L. REV. 1051, 1075 (2017). 
 15. For example, many fines, fees, and court costs are established at a set amount 
and automatically applied upon the conclusion of a case. 
 16. Restitution, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“Compensation for 
loss; esp., full or partial compensation paid by a criminal to a victim, not awarded in 
a civil trial for tort, but ordered as a part of a criminal sentence or as a condition of 
probation.”); see also Restitution, NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200106012317/https://victimsofcrime.org/help-for-
crime-victims/get-help-bulletins-for-crime-victims/restitution] (providing a guide for 
victims of crime about what restitution is and sharing strategies to ensure that it is 
collected). 
 17. Harris et al., supra note 12, at 1774 (tracking restitution orders in felony 
cases ranging from $500 to a staggering $256,257). 
 18. Ryan Anderson, The System is Rigged: Restitution Is Blind to the Victim’s 
Fault, 43 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 140, 149 (2017). 
 19. David & Bradford, supra note 14, at 1075. 
 20. Scholars have traced restitution’s roots to ancient indigenous and religious 
traditions. See Nancy Lucas, Restitution, Rehabilitation, Prevention, and 
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not begin to implement structured restitution programs in any 
widespread manner until the 1970s.21 The rise of restitution within 
the justice system reflected a change in society at large. 
Spearheaded by the Victim’s Rights Movement in the early 1970s,22 
the narrative around crime, punishment, and justice shifted from 
marginally considering the victim’s wants and needs to centering 
the victim’s views of what a successful resolution to their case would 
look like.23 Critics and commentators declared restitution a 
valuable—even restorative—factor in ensuring that justice was 
done for the victim.24 Currently, all states have statutory provisions 
permitting restitution25 and fourteen states, including Minnesota, 
demonstrate their commitment to ensuring restitution is paid by 
levying civil judgments against individuals with outstanding 
restitution orders.26 
It did not take long for courts and scholars to note that 
restitution seemed particularly suited to juvenile court, where 
traditional incarceration is often neither desired nor appropriate.27 
Resultingly, there exists a “shortage of useful sentencing options” 
by which justice-involved youth may be punished or held 
 
Transformation: Victim-Offender Mediation for First-Time Non-violent Youthful 
Offenders, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1365, 1370 (2001); Anderson, supra note 18, at 148–
49. 
 21. Burt Galaway, Is Restitution Practical?, 41 FED. PROBATION 3, 3 (1977) 
(“During 1976 and 1977 the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration has 
systematically funded a series of pilot adult and juvenile restitution programs to 
further test the feasibility of using this concept in the criminal justice system.”).  
 22. See generally History of Victims’ Rights, NAT’L CRIME VICTIM L. INST., 
https://law.lclark.edu/centers/national_crime_victim_law_institute/about_ncvli/hist
ory_of_victims_rights/ [perma.cc/3P2S-LF5H] (discussing the history of the Modern 
Crime Victims’ Rights Movement). 
 23. Ruback, supra note 12, at 1788. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Susan Jacobs & David C. Moore, Successful Restitution as a Predictor of 
Juvenile Recidivism, 45 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 3, 3–4 (1994). 
 26. See, e.g., RESTITUTION: COLLECTING CIVIL JUDGMENTS RESULTING FROM 
RESTITUTION ORDERS, CARVER CNTY., MINN., https://www.co.carver.mn.us/home/ 
showdocument?id=12300 [perma.cc/L4JP-86NG] (“Judges can order the restitution 
converted into a civil judgment if the offender has not paid in full and the offender’s 
probationary period is expiring. Crime victims can file an Affidavit of Identification 
of Judgment Debtor along with a copy of the Restitution Order to start the Civil file 
for the amount owed to them. This process can be done immediately after the Order 
for Restitution has been Ordered.”); see also Ruback, supra note 12, at 1794. 
 27. See generally Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (finding a sentence 
of lifetime incarceration without parole a violation of the Eighth Amendment when 
given to juveniles). But see Jones v. Mississippi, no. 18-1259, slip op. R-30 (Apr. 22, 
2021). 
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accountable.28 Today, all but one state has added an additional 
statute or provision directly governing juvenile restitution.29 
B. Restitution in Minnesota: Past and Present 
Likely guided by the nationwide trend,30 Minnesota first 
enacted a criminal restitution statute, Section 611A.04, in 1983.31 
This original statute operated with very few procedural 
requirements and solely considered the financial losses that a 
victim self-reported: the victim would submit an itemized list of the 
losses they sustained to the court, and the court would issue 
restitution in that amount.32 Shortly after the original statute’s 
enactment, the Minnesota Legislature enacted Section 611A.045,33 
which widened (albeit only slightly) the factors that a court was 
required to consider before issuing a restitution award.34 By 1989, 
the Legislature updated Section 611A.045 to include a few basic 
requirements that remain virtually untouched to date:35 the trial 
court was mandated to weigh “the amount of economic loss 
sustained by the victim as a result of the offense; and the income, 
resources, and obligations of the defendant.”36 
Although this new addition seemed to provide an opportunity 
for more nuanced and complex restitution orders, case law 
interpreting these requirements somewhat foreclosed this 
possibility. Courts have since held that when “balancing” the 
monetary loss sustained and the defendant’s ability to pay, the trial 
court judge can tip the scales to (heavily) favor the victim; a judge 
can order restitution without making any specific findings about a 
defendant’s ability to pay, even if there is a potential financial 
hardship to the defendant and their family.37 After receiving a 
 
 28. Haynes et al., supra note 9, at 35. 
 29. For a thorough compilation of juvenile restitution statutes across the United 
States, see Juvenile Restitution Statutes, NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR. (Mar. 2015), 
https://njdc.info/juvenile-restitution-statutes/ [perma.cc/ZRP3-457J]. 
 30. NAT’L CRIME VICTIM L. INST., supra note 22 (discussing the impetus for the 
Victim’s Rights Movements, which led to a surge in the use of restitution). 
 31. Anderson, supra note 18, at 148–49. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id.; MINN. STAT. § 611A.04. 
 35. NAT’L CRIME VICTIM L. INST., supra note 22. 
 36. MINN. STAT. § 611A.045(1)(a)(1)–(2). 
 37. State v. Jola, 409 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (“[Defendants] argue 
that they should not be required to pay restitution because no specific findings were 
made on their ability to pay and restitution should not be punitive. The purpose of 
restitution is to compensate the victim and not rehabilitate the defendant.” (emphasis 
added)). 
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court-mandated restitution order, the defendant has a thirty-day 
window in which to challenge the order,38 but then must make 
payments (typically on a payment schedule generated by the 
court)39 to a court administrator, who passes the money along to the 
impacted individuals.40 
The first appearance of a juvenile-specific restitution statute 
in Minnesota appeared in 1999, when the Legislature brought forth 
an act recodifying and clarifying procedures related to juvenile 
delinquency and child protection.41 Though very general, the 
juvenile restitution practices detailed within the 1999 statute 
remain largely unchanged today. One study found that, both then 
and now, juveniles with exposure to the criminal justice system 
encounter a restitution process substantially similar to that 
functioning within the adult court.42 Courts subject justice-involved 
youth to the requirements contained within the general restitution 
statutes, Minnesota Statutes Sections 611A.045 and 611A.04 
(which provide an overview of what can be included in a restitution 
request and order), along with one statute specific to the juvenile 
restitution context, Section 260b.198. While only a few additional 
requirements are imposed by Section 260b.198, the language used 
to express these considerations is broad.43 After a trial court 
adjudicates a child delinquent, “the court may order the child to 
make reasonable restitution for such damage,”44 and failure to do so 
(by not paying or falling behind on the court-generated payment 
schedule) can result in a probation violation.45 Few Minnesota cases 
have interpreted these statutory provisions in a manner that 
provides concrete guidance to judges and attorneys alike, leading to 
continued confusion about where the confines of restitution—
particularly juvenile restitution—truly lie.46 
 
 38. MINN. STAT. § 611A.045(3)(b). 
 39. MINN. STAT. § 611A.045. 
 40. OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, MINN. OFF. OF PUB. SAFETY, MINNESOTA 
RESTITUTION WORKING GROUP: REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, 6–7 (2015) 
[hereinafter MINNESOTA RESTITUTION WORKING GROUP]. 
 41. See 1999 Minn. Laws 616 (enacting new language involving juvenile-specific 
restitution in Minnesota); MINN. STAT. § 260b.198. 
 42. Haynes et al., supra note 9, at 32 (stating that juvenile punishments should 
be scaled below adult punishments). 
 43. See MINN. STAT. § 260b.198(1)(5). 
 44. Id. (emphasis added). 
 45. MINN. STAT. § 260b.198(8). 
 46. See MINNESOTA RESTITUTION WORKING GROUP, supra note 40, at 6–7. 
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While arguably unforeseen at its inception,47 restitution has 
become one of the most common dispositions given to children and 
teenagers in Minnesota at the conclusion of delinquency hearings.48 
In 2016, the Hennepin County Department of Community 
Corrections and Rehabilitation (DOCCR) identified 242 juveniles in 
Minnesota’s Fourth Judicial District Court (Hennepin County) who 
were paying off restitution orders.49 These individuals constituted 
just over 20% of the justice-involved youth under DOCCR 
jurisdiction.50 Of the 242 kids ordered to pay restitution, the largest 
portion were adjudicated delinquent for misdemeanor offenses,51 
with property crimes making up the bulk of the restitution orders.52 
In Hennepin County, the average age of an adolescent ordered to 
pay restitution was 15.3 years,53 and the vast majority of these 
adolescents were Black.54 Notably, the average age for Native and 
Black youth who received restitution orders was lower than the 
overall average, at 14 and 14.9, respectively.55 
Because the Legislature gave Minnesota courts the statutory 
authority to sentence these youth to restitution, it is surprising that 
the Legislature did not also consider how child labor laws may be a 
limiting factor in a fourteen- or fifteen-year-old’s ability to pay. 
Although teenagers of age fourteen and older can legally work in 
Minnesota,56 a number of regulations cap the number of hours and 
timeframes during which individuals under sixteen can work,57 
thus making it difficult for a young teenager to spend substantive 
 
 47. See generally Galaway, supra note 21, at 5–6 (arguing, in 1977, that the 
problem of the “indigent offender” is likely overstated, as most of the restitution 
programs and orders are “modest” in scope (under $200), and that with the aid of a 
payment plan, most offenders could cover their restitution obligations). 
 48. Sarah J. Batzli, Case Note, In re Welfare of L.K.W., 372 N.W.2d 392 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1985), 13 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 247, 253 (1987). 
 49. HENNEPIN CNTY. DEP’T OF CMTY. CORR. & REHAB., 2016 PROFILE OF 
JUVENILES UNDER DOCCR JURISDICTION 2 (2017). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 5 (explaining that 40% of youth charged with misdemeanors received 
restitution after their adjudication). 
 52. Compare id. at 9, with MINNESOTA RESTITUTION WORKING GROUP, supra 
note 40, at 19, 34 (indicating that in statistics on the adult side of restitution, 
restitution orders at both county and statewide levels were largely for felony 
offenses). 
 53. HENNEPIN CNTY. DEP’T OF CMTY. CORR. & REHAB., supra note 49, at 3 fig.4 
(tracking age at intake). 
 54. Id. at 4 fig.5. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Child Labor FAQS, MINN. DEP’T OF LAB. & INDUSTRY, 
https://www.dli.mn.gov/business/employment-practices/child-labor-faqs [perma.cc/ 
CZS9-K2YG]. 
 57. Id. 
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time working for pay—and, in turn, more difficult for a self-
supporting teenager to pay restitution. Just as in adult court, if a 
child or teenager is unable to meet the requirements of their 
restitution order, their inability to comply with the terms of their 
adjudication constitutes a probation violation,58 extending the 
length of time they remain subject to close monitoring by the state. 
If their restitution remains unpaid, in part or in full, the 
outstanding amount becomes a civil judgment against justice-
involved youth when they turn eighteen.59 
C. Restitution’s Theoretical Goals 
The past fifty years have seen a growing reliance on 
restitution, which has been met with strong support from “both 
juvenile justice practitioners . . . and the general public.”60 
Academics who support juvenile restitution theorize that it makes 
victims “whole”61 while simultaneously holding “offenders” 
responsible for rectifying the damage that they caused.62 
Furthermore, these same scholars hypothesize that the process of 
making court-ordered payments “aids in the rehabilitation of the 
criminal.”63 Throughout the past few decades, researchers have 
predicted that restitution will reduce recidivism by teaching justice-
involved youth about accountability64 while instilling within these 
individuals a “sense of accomplishment” for repairing the harms 
they caused.65 
Assuming this theory is correct, restitution serves two 
laudable and essential goals: it compensates a victim for the 
financial loss that they suffered while also “rehabilitating” the 
individual responsible by forcing them to acknowledge the harm 
they caused. Predicted to be a positive side effect, the hope has been 
that the second component will reduce recidivism among the 
justice-involved youth population.66 This two-part theory about 
 
 58. MINN. STAT. § 260b.198(8). 
 59. See Ruback, supra note 12, at 1794. 
 60. Haynes et al., supra note 9, at 32. 
 61. Richard E. Laster, Criminal Restitution: A Survey of Its Past History and an 
Analysis of Its Present Usefulness, 5 U. RICH. L. REV. 71, 80 (1970); see also Linda F. 
Frank, The Collection of Restitution: An Often Overlooked Service to Crime Victims, 
8 J.C.R. & ECON. DEV. 107, 119–20, 134 (1992). 
 62. Ruback, supra note 12, at 1790–91. 
 63. Laster, supra note 61, at 80. 
 64. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., RESTITUTION BY JUVENILES: INFORMATION AND 
OPERATING GUIDE FOR RESTITUTION PROGRAMS 3 (1988); see also Jacobs & Moore, 
supra note 25, at 4. 
 65. Ruback, supra note 12, at 1791. 
 66. Id. 
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restitution has inspired scholars and practitioners to categorize 
restitution as a restorative justice67 program.68 In that vein, many 
practitioners, guided by the view that restitution employs 
restorative rather than punitive justice, have advocated for an 
increased reliance on restitution in the juvenile justice system to 
better prioritize rehabilitation over punishment.69 Some of these 
same practitioners anticipate that parents will pay the (presumably 
manageable) restitution orders juveniles receive.70 
But of the two idealistic goals identified by scholars, only one 
seems to matter in practice: making payments. In studies spanning 
multiple decades, scholars across the U.S. have attempted to study 
the effectiveness or “success” of restitution by tracking how many 
restitution orders were fulfilled71 and, in a few cases, whether the 
justice-involved youth recidivated.72 While these are important 
metrics to track, these studies leave many other measures of 
success unaddressed. Notably absent from these studies are 
meaningful qualitative measures of whether the justice-involved 
youth felt a sense of accomplishment after paying down their debt, 
or whether the restitution process taught them lessons about 
accountability or the wrongfulness of their acts. Also absent is any 
data conclusively indicating that juvenile restitution programs are 
successful; restitution payment rates differ dramatically from state 
to state73 and, in general, a high percentage of youth fail to pay their 
restitution.74 While some studies have traced a connection between 
paying restitution and a decrease in recidivism,75 the practitioners 
of these studies admit that this connection might be more indicative 
of the socioeconomic status of the child’s family than the 
 
 67. Id. at 1798 (“Restorative justice practices assume that the justice process is 
about repairing the harm from a crime in a way that balances the needs of the victim, 
the community, and the offender.”). 
 68. Haynes et al., supra note 9, at 33. 
 69. See supra note 10 (discussing the United States Supreme Court’s recognition 
of a rehabilitative framework in juvenile law). 
 70. Haynes et al., supra note 9, at 37. 
 71. See Sudipto Roy, Two Types of Juvenile Restitution Programs in Two 
Midwestern Counties: A Comparative Study, 57 FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1993 at 48; see 
also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., RESTITUTION BY JUVENILES, supra note 64, at 3; Jacobs & 
Moore, supra note 25, at 3. 
 72. Roy, supra note 71, at 48. 
 73. Hager, supra note 4 (noting that 87% of orders were paid in Connecticut, 
while only 28% of orders were paid in Mississippi). 
 74. See Haynes et al., supra note 9, at 37. 
 75. Id. at 37–38. 
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rehabilitative effect of restitution.76 Ultimately, the many gaps in 
these data suggest that the strong support juvenile restitution has 
received is not supported by equally strong results confirming 
restitution’s effectiveness. 
II. The Need for Restorative Justice in the Juvenile 
Delinquency System and Restitution’s Shortcomings 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held in a recent string of 
landmark cases77 that children are constitutionally different than 
adults when it comes to sentencing and punishment.78 As science, 
social science, and common sense79 demonstrate, juveniles who 
commit criminal acts of even the most serious caliber possess both 
diminished culpability—due to many factors, including their 
immaturity, vulnerability to negative influences, inability to control 
the environment in which they are situated, and malleable 
character traits80—and a heightened capacity to change as they 
grow older.81 Each of these Supreme Court decisions was rooted in 
the belief that the vast majority of justice-involved youth are 
capable of rehabilitation,82 and that the applicable punishments 
must be adjusted accordingly.83 
Courts across the country followed suit by recognizing that 
juveniles are inherently different than adults,84 and that 
rehabilitation rather than punishment must be the focus of juvenile 
 
 76. Id. at 51 (“In other words, juveniles who paid a greater percentage of their 
economic sanctions might have come from families with greater means to pay and 
might have been less likely to recidivate in the first place.”). 
 77. See supra note 10 (discussing cases in which the United States Supreme 
Court recognized a rehabilitative framework in juvenile law). 
 78. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 460–62 (2012). See Christopher Northrop & 
Kristina Rothley Rozan, Kids Will Be Kids: Time for a Reasonable Child Standard 
for the Proof of Objective Mens Rea Elements, 69 ME. L. REV. 109, 111–12 (2017) for 
an interesting discussion inspired by this Supreme Court precedent that advocates 
for a different standard of reasonableness for children in criminal proceedings in 
recognition of the differences in brain functioning and culpability between juveniles 
and adults. 
 79. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (finding support for the 
Court’s conclusions in psychology and brain science, but also in what “any parent 
knows” about how kids think and impulsively act). 
 80. Id. at 569–70. 
 81. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471–72. 
 82. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733–34 (2016). 
 83.  But see Jones v. Mississippi, no. 18-1259, slip op. R-30 at 5 (Apr. 22, 2021) 
(finding a sentencing judge has discretion to impose a lesser sentence than life 
without parole, but may institute a life-without-parole sentence without making any 
explicit or implicit finding of “permanent incorrigibility”). 
 84. See Haynes et al., supra note 9, at 32. 
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delinquency courts.85 This shift is visible in the implementation of 
restorative justice practices in juvenile courts nationwide. Unlike 
punitive responses to transgressions, which calculate offenses in 
terms of laws broken or property damaged, restorative justice 
focuses on the ways that wrongdoings harm people and 
relationships.86 When properly implemented in a court setting, 
restorative justice often features a formal process administered by 
the state and an informal process led by the community.87 The latter 
component, which typically involves practices like Victim Offender 
Mediation (VOM) or other face-to-face discussions between the 
victim and offender, attempts to balance the needs of all parties 
while reintegrating the offender peacefully and thoughtfully into 
their community.88 
A. Juvenile Restitution Falls Short of “Restorative” in 
Hennepin County, Minnesota 
In Minnesota (as in many other states), courts have begun to 
classify restitution programs as one of the “restorative justice” 
initiatives available to children adjudicated delinquent.89 In some 
of the jurisdictions where they are used, restorative juvenile 
restitution initiatives require the justice-involved youth to 
participate in dialogues with the individuals impacted by their 
wrongful acts;90 other programs see juveniles partaking in the VOM 
process while simultaneously working to pay down their restitution 
orders.91 In Hennepin County, however, where the juvenile 
restitution program closely mirrors its adult equivalent, there are 
no mandatory VOM mediations, no meetings, and virtually no 
communication between the juveniles ordered to pay restitution 
 
 85. See id. 
 86. MINN. MGMT. & BUDGET, JUVENILE JUSTICE REPORT: JUVENILE JUSTICE 
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 47 (2018) [hereinafter MINN. JUVENILE JUSTICE REPORT]. 
Rather than asking “what law was broken, who broke it and what punishment is 
deserved,” restorative justice requires a legal and social community to ask who was 
harmed, what this person’s needs might be, and how those needs can be met. Lara 
Bazelon, Oakland Demonstrates Right Way to Use Restorative Justice with Teens, 
JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCHANGE (Jan. 3, 2019), https://jjie.org/2019/01/03/oakland-
demonstrates-right-way-to-use-restorative-justice-with-teens/ [perma.cc/77SC-
DZCJ]. 
 87. Ruback, supra note 12, at 1798. 
 88. See id. 
 89. MINN. JUVENILE JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 86, at 47. But cf. State v. Jola, 
409 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (declaring that the goal of restitution is not 
rehabilitation but simply payment to the victim). 
 90. Roy, supra note 71, at 49. 
 91. See Lucas, supra note 20, at 1375. 
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and the individual(s) they are paying it to.92 Rather, the restitution 
process is boiled down to its most basic bureaucratic components: a 
judge adjudicates a child delinquent, orders them to pay restitution, 
places them on a payment schedule, and requires the child to pay a 
designated amount to a court administrator on a court-mandated 
basis.93 Nevertheless, the State of Minnesota lists restitution 
among the restorative justice programs it utilizes.94 
At a theoretical level, restitution processes like that 
implemented in Hennepin County may be classified as “restorative” 
because some academics speculate that a nebulous, philosophical 
change occurs when youth are held monetarily accountable for their 
wrongdoings.95 In practice, however, the theoretical effectiveness of 
restitution towards reducing recidivism and rehabilitating children 
who have committed crimes remains unproven.96 Studies 
increasingly suggest that emotional accountability does not 
necessarily accompany monetary accountability, especially when all 
that is required of justice-involved youth is that they pay a bill to 
the court.97 Children from affluent backgrounds may receive 
financial support from their families,98 while children from families 
that are already in debt or struggling to pay their bills simply 
accumulate more debt, thereby reducing their (already limited) 
family income.99 For children in this second category, the 
accumulation of debt—paired with the reduction in job prospects 
that follows a criminal record—counterintuitively increases the 
likelihood of a child’s ongoing involvement with the justice 
system.100 
Taken together, the lack of clarity about whether restitution 
produces recidivism or emotional accountability and the clear 
 
 92. See MINNESOTA RESTITUTION WORKING GROUP, supra note 40, at 6 (grouping 
adult and juvenile cases in the explanation of the statutory scheme guiding “ordering 
restitution” in Minnesota). 
 93. See id. 
 94. MINN. JUVENILE JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 86, at 47. 
 95. See Jacobs & Moore, supra note 25, at 4. 
 96. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 97. See generally Hager, supra note 4 (discussing both the merits and 
ineffectiveness of restitution). 
 98. See, e.g., Haynes et al., supra note 9, at 51. 
 99. See, e.g., Harris et al., supra note 17, at 1756. 
 100. See id.; see also Northrop & Rozan, supra note 78, at 112 (discussing a 
juvenile criminal record’s potential impact on future educational, employment, and 
housing opportunities). For an in-depth analysis of the unexpected and 
counterintuitive impacts of well-meaning criminal justice reforms, see MAYA 
SCHENWAR & VICTORIA LAW, PRISON BY ANY OTHER NAME: THE HARMFUL 
CONSEQUENCES OF POPULAR REFORMS (2020). 
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socioeconomic disparities impacting outcomes suggest that a 
practical process in Hennepin County that strips juvenile 
restitution of any mediation, dialogue, or interaction between 
offender and victim cannot be considered conclusively restorative. 
In practice, such a system imposes an uneven punitive burden and 
likely makes it difficult for many juvenile offenders to reach a point 
of restorative change. True restorative justice directly “involves 
offenders . . . in deciding how to make amends for their crimes, 
rather than relegating them to being ‘the passive objects of 
punishment.’”101 Thus, when court systems focus solely on ordering 
restitution for a justice-involved child to pay, the “emotional issues 
surrounding crime and victimization, including even the possibility 
of forgiveness and reconciliation” remain unaddressed.102 
B. Restorative Justice Requires More than Restitution 
Payments Alone 
Stand-alone restitution orders will not bring restorative 
justice to juvenile court in Hennepin County, as restorative justice 
requires a sense of human connection and interpersonal 
understanding that is unlikely to be generated by sending a check 
to a court administrator. Other jurisdictions have adjusted their 
juvenile restitution processes to embrace the principles of 
restorative justice—and studies hint at the positive outcomes of this 
approach. 
In a study tracking the impact of VOM on restitution payment 
in Minneapolis and Albuquerque, researchers found that juvenile 
offenders who participated in VOM while paying down restitution 
were statistically more likely to pay their restitution than 
individuals who received a restitution order without also attending 
mediation.103 The same participants in VOM programming 
committed fewer and less serious crimes than their counterparts 
who were subject to traditional programming.104 Other studies have 
 
 101. Lucas, supra note 20, at 1372. 
 102. Id. at 1399 (quoting MARK S. UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER: THE 
IMPACT OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND MEDIATION 157–58 (1994)). 
 103. See id. at 1375 n.58 (“‘Offenders who negotiated restitution agreements with 
their victims through a process of mediation were considerably more likely to 
actually complete their restitution obligation than similar offenders who were 
ordered by the court to pay a set amount of restitution.’ In . . . [a] Minneapolis study, 
69% of offenders in a VOM program paid restitution, compared to 54% who did not 
go through the mediation process. In Albuquerque . . . 86% of offenders paid full 
restitution following VOM compared to 57% of the non-mediation offenders.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 104. Id. 
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similarly indicated that programs involving face-to-face meetings 
are more effective than remote, court-based programs.105 Of course, 
creative and restorative solutions may extend well beyond VOM 
and face-to-face interaction; other practitioners have called for a 
greater reliance upon community service for which juveniles receive 
an hourly stipend.106 While the theories supporting this approach 
employ similar rationales to the traditional theories celebrating 
juvenile restitution107—i.e., by working many hours for an hourly 
wage, children are forced to reckon with the amount of harm they 
caused and their role in repairing it—the community service aspect 
aligns it more precisely with restorative justice. While working to 
pay back individuals harmed by their wrongful acts, justice-
involved youth who volunteer are made aware of their role within a 
community, and hopefully begin to understand that their actions 
can either harm their community or strengthen it.108 
Currently, a limited version of paid restorative justice is 
present in Hennepin County in its Sentence to Service (STS) 
programming, which allows juveniles to volunteer on weekends to 
pay off a restitution order.109 An expansion of this program, paired 
with VOM programming or other opportunities for discussion 
between all impacted parties, may push Hennepin County’s 
juvenile restitution from the punitive to the restorative realm. 
Importantly, the input of both victim and offender is considered 
essential to true restorative justice: the person who did something 
wrong and the individual(s) impacted by these actions must both 
show a willingness to work through hard feelings to reach an 
agreement.110 These agreements should look different depending on 
the unique parties involved; thus, any true restorative system of 
 
 105. See Roy, supra note 71, at 48. 
 106. See Haynes et al., supra note 9, at 52. 
 107. See id. at 33, 52. 
 108. It is important to note that, like restitution, court-mandated community 
service could be more rehabilitative in theory than in practice. See, e.g., SCHENWAR 
& LAW, supra note 100, at 51–57, 89 (arguing that many prison reform efforts, 
including probation and court-ordered treatment, continue to have harmful impacts 
on the lives of individuals). For example, probation has been identified as “one of the 
most significant drivers of mass incarceration” despite typically being used to avoid 
prison time. Id. at 87. While, in theory, community service enables rehabilitation 
and aligns with restorative justice ideals, certain implementations of this practice 
could result in forced, punitive community service (think: a chain gang). To combat 
this from happening, juvenile courts hoping to implement community service should 
allow justice-involved youth to have some autonomy over where they volunteer, and 
how and when they serve their communities. 
 109. See Sentencing to Service, HENNEPIN CNTY. https://www.hennepin.us/ 
residents/public-safety/sentencing-service [perma.cc/8ZPK-AJA9]. 
 110. See Ruback, supra note 12, at 1798. 
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accountability must eschew the rigidity of our current juvenile 
delinquency system to embrace a more flexible, open approach to 
justice. Though daunting, this task may see more success in 
addressing the emotional issues surrounding crime111 and, 
surprisingly, save the court systems a substantial amount of 
money.112 
III. An Overhaul of Juvenile Restitution in Hennepin 
County: Large (and Small) Changes Towards a More 
Equitable Institution 
As it currently operates, Hennepin County’s system of juvenile 
restitution fails to function in a rehabilitative or restorative 
manner. Despite their lessened culpability and heightened capacity 
to change, children and teenagers adjudicated delinquent face a 
restitution process functionally equivalent to that used in Hennepin 
County’s adult court. Restitution in Minnesota, though part of the 
adult court system for nearly forty years and the juvenile system 
for over twenty,113 has been subject to restrained judicial 
interpretation and few structural changes.114 Without requiring 
regular analysis of the financial statuses of justice-involved 
youth,115 courts continue to order restitution payments in 
increasingly high amounts116 and, if the juvenile with a restitution 
order cannot or does not meet their payments, they both violate 
their probation and carry a debt with them from childhood into 
adulthood. As a disproportionate number of juveniles entering the 
criminal justice system live in poverty,117 this debt unevenly 
burdens those who are already struggling financially and plunges 
them deeper into the cycle of poverty. This, in turn, makes it more 
difficult for them to increase household wealth and reach financial 
 
 111. See Lucas, supra note 20, at 1399. 
 112. See id. at 1375. 
 113. See Act of May 11, 1999, ch. 139, § 30, 1999 Minn. Laws 616–18 (codified at 
MINN. STAT. § 260b.198); Anderson, supra note 18, at 148. 
 114. See Anderson, supra note 18, at 148. 
 115. See In re Welfare of L.F.M., No. A13-0541, 2013 WL 5778221, at *3 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2013) (citing State v. Jola, 409 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)) 
(stating that “[a] district court does not abuse its discretion by ordering restitution 
without specific findings regarding the defendant’s ability to pay, even if there is a 
potential financial hardship to the defendant.”). 
 116. See Galaway, supra note 21, at 5 (noting that in the early days of restitution, 
orders did not typically stretch beyond $200). 
 117. See Tamar R. Birckhead, Delinquent by Reason of Poverty, 38 WASH. U. J.L. 
& POL’Y 53, 70–79 (2012). 
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stability, while simultaneously increasing the likelihood that the 
youth will reoffend.118 
In addition to exploring the impacts restitution may have on 
justice-involved youth, the conversation on juvenile restitution 
must not overlook its impacts on victims harmed by the actions of 
justice-involved youth. Restitution was so widely implemented not 
just to hold youth accountable, but also to ease the financial and 
psychological harms experienced by victims.119 In many cases, 
restitution is a service that is valuable to—and, at times, 
desperately needed by—victims of crime.120 Yet, as discussed in 
further detail above, studies suggest that many restitution orders 
remain unpaid,121 and the parties waiting for compensation fail to 
receive it. This statistic is particularly salient when considering the 
population of justice-involved youth, which is disproportionally 
poor122 and, as a result of youth, less likely to have employment (not 
to mention well-paid employment). Restitution programs cannot 
make a victim whole if the person ordered to pay restitution simply 
cannot afford to pay it. 
Like many broader aspects of the criminal justice system—
and, as some argue, many broader aspects of well-intentioned, 
popular criminal justice reforms123—Hennepin County’s local 
process of juvenile restitution falls short of its stated goals. Yet 
changes at the county- and state-wide levels can begin the process 
of fixing it, thus bettering the experience for justice-involved youth 
and the people harmed by their actions. 
A. Statutory Interpretation of Minnesota Statutes Sections 
260b.198 and 611A.045 
As noted previously, the statutes most applicable to juvenile 
restitution, Minnesota Statutes Sections 260b.198 and 611A.045, 
each discuss the restitution process in broad terms. The court, 
Section 611A.045 explains, shall consider the economic loss 
sustained by the victim as well as the income, resources, and 
 
 118. See Harris et al., supra note 12, at 1761. 
 119. See Ruback, supra note 12, at 1783. 
 120. See id. at 1789 (explaining that, statistically, victims of crime are often 
demographically similar to the perpetrators of the crime: disproportionately poor). 
 121. See Hager, supra note 4 (noting that “[c]ourts’ success in collecting juvenile 
restitution varies by state” and “[f]or amounts of more than $10,000, the payment 
rate is nearly zero in many states.”). 
 122. See Birckhead, supra note 117, at 58 (stating that “[j]uvenile courts have 
traditionally been considered the courts of the poor and impoverished”). 
 123. See generally SCHENWAR & LAW, supra note 100 (discussing the unintended 
negative consequences stemming from prevalent criminal justice practices). 
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obligations of the defendant.124 When a child causes such economic 
loss, Section 260b.198 additionally requires that a court order 
“reasonable restitution” for the damage.125 Both statutes are broad 
enough to allow for a rigorous restitution process that fully 
evaluates the financial obligations and limitations of a defendant 
before ordering restitution to be paid, or for a process devoid of such 
an individual analysis. In interpreting these statutes, Minnesota 
courts have not only adopted the second approach, but have 
declared that courts need not make any specific findings about an 
offender’s ability to pay.126 
This is a problem. While a child’s ability to pay is incorporated 
in relevant statutes, it is too often absent from the balancing test 
used by judges. In a recent report requested by the Legislature,127 
the Minnesota Department of Public Safety’s Restitution Working 
Group identified this precise issue as a major roadblock in the 
restitution process.128 Quoting the adage “[y]ou can’t get blood from 
a turnip,”129 the Restitution Working Group acknowledged that the 
major reason why so many Minnesota restitution orders go unpaid 
is perhaps the most simple reason: people don’t have the ability to 
pay them.130 The Group went on to recommend the State adopt a 
standard, objective process to assess an individual’s ability to pay 
restitution so that orders will be realistic rather than unpayable.131 
Increasingly, jurisdictions outside of Minnesota are 
considering such an approach.132 Notably, Maine’s Legislature 
suggested revamping their restitution statutes to include monetary 
caps on juvenile restitution,133 while other jurisdictions with 
statutes similar to Minnesota’s must consider ability to pay. In 
Indiana, for example, the vagueness surrounding one’s ability to 
pay is removed: rather than suggesting that courts “consider” 
ability to pay, as Minnesota does, Indiana law mandates that 
 
 124. MINN. STAT. § 611A.045(1). 
 125. MINN. STAT. § 260B.198(1)(a)(5). 
 126. In re Welfare of L.F.M., No. A13-0541, 2013 WL 5778221, at *3 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Oct. 28, 2013) (citing State v. Jola, 409 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)). 
 127. MINNESOTA RESTITUTION WORKING GROUP, supra note 40. 
 128. Id. at 12. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See Hager, supra note 4; see, e.g., David & Bradford, supra note 14, at 1080 
(discussing Indiana’s approach). 
 133. See Hager, supra note 4 (tracing the Maine Legislature’s attempts to limit 
the use of restitution and impose an $800 cap on orders given to juveniles). 
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restitution orders may not exceed a person’s ability to pay.134 To 
support this policy, trial courts are required to determine a party’s 
financial obligations and earnings, and often consider additional 
factors that impact ability to pay, such as the defendant’s health 
and employment history.135 While critics sometimes balk at the 
addition of “ability to pay” to the restitution calculation due to 
supposed complications in determining financial ability,136 states 
like Indiana demonstrate that a quick and holistic review of an 
individual’s finances, earning capacity, financial obligations, and 
preexisting debt provides a solid starting point. 
While a massive restitution overhaul might benefit Hennepin 
County (more on that below), small adjustments in statutory 
interpretation may also benefit all involved parties. As a state-wide 
measure, Minnesota courts should take seriously their obligation 
under Minnesota Statutes Section 611A.045 to, at the very least, 
consider each individual offender’s ability to pay. In following the 
status quo in interpreting restitution statutes, Minnesota courts 
effectively overlook a specific statutory requirement and perpetuate 
a cycle of debt that harms justice-involved youth and deprives 
victims of their promised restitution. Hennepin County courts 
already have procedures in place to quickly evaluate an individual’s 
financial resources in determining whether an individual is eligible 
for a public defender137 or capable of paying child support at the set 
amount;138 a similar process could be implemented after said 
individual is found guilty or adjudicated delinquent to determine 
how much restitution they could conceivably pay. 
An additional statutory requirement in Minnesota Statutes 
Section 260b.198 mandates that restitution orders be reasonable.139 
As this requirement is incorporated in the juvenile—rather than the 
 
 134. IND. CODE § 35-38-2-2.3(a)(6) (2017); see also David & Bradford, supra note 
14, at 1080. 
 135. See Bell v. State, 59 N.E.3d 959, 964 (Ind. 2016); Champlain v. State, 717 
N.E.2d 567, 570 (Ind. 1999); Sales v. State, 464 N.E.2d 1336, 1340 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1984); see also David & Bradford, supra note 14, at 1081. 
 136. Ruback, supra note 12, at 1806, 1809 (“Most courts do not have a written 
plan for how . . . a determination [of an individual’s ability to pay] should be made” 
and that “in the United States, determining ability to pay is not straightforward.”). 
 137. MINN. STAT. § 611.17. 
 138. For “ability to pay” assessments in calculating child support payments, see 
MINN. STAT. § 518A.42; LYNN AVES, MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES RSCH. DEP’T, 
MINNESOTA’S CHILD SUPPORT LAWS 1, 8 (2015), https://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/ 
hrd/pubs/chldsupp.pdf [perma.cc/55VK-ELX3] (explaining that low-income obligors 
receive a “self-support adjustment,” and if an obligor’s income is less than 120% of 
the poverty line, their payment is reduced to a “minimum support order” of 
$50/month). 
 139. MINN. STAT. § 260b.198(1)(5). 
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general—restitution statute, it should be read to have a juvenile-
specific intent and effect.140 When financial resources and 
limitations are discussed, few populations are more constrained 
than the one that forms the bulk of the juvenile delinquency system: 
low-income youth. Youth from working-class and poor families are 
unlikely to receive significant support in paying off a restitution 
order, as their parents may already be stretched thin by bills and 
debts. Further, even if these children are old enough to work and 
have their own jobs, income generated from employment is often 
diverted to family bills or an individual’s need to self-support.141 
With these realities in mind, “reasonable” restitution for 
juveniles begins to take form. It must be within an offender’s ability 
to pay, and their ability to pay on their own must be considered, as 
financial support from adults is simply not an option for many in 
Hennepin County and Minnesota at large. Ideally, reasonable 
restitution would not extend beyond a certain dollar amount; 
accordingly, a cap on restitution in juvenile court may be 
appropriate. 
B. Changes at the County Level 
While the Minnesota Legislature would likely need to initiate 
many of these proposed restitution reforms, Hennepin County has 
the ability to independently enact changes to strengthen its juvenile 
restitution process. 
As discussed in Part II, one change beneficial to offenders and 
victims alike involves incorporating Victim Offender Mediation or 
expanding the paid community service program to make restitution 
a true vehicle of restorative justice. While these measures may 
initially pose up-front training or implementation costs, they have 
the potential to reduce expenses incurred by the juvenile 
delinquency system (via a decrease in reliance on traditional court 
 
 140. Support for interpreting the word “reasonable” in a substantive and 
meaningful way can be found in the presumption against surplus language, a 
semantic canon traditionally utilized in statutory interpretation. This canon of 
construction argues that a statute should be interpreted to give meaning to every 
word and avoid redundancy or futility of language. 
 141. It is not uncommon for children from poor and working-class families to work 
a part-time job so that they can contribute to household expenses. See Darryl E. 
Owens, More Teens Working to Pay Family Bills, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Mar. 3, 1998), 
https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/os-xpm-1998-03-03-9803020728-story.html 
[perma.cc/Y7DA-HDBC] (discussing a nationwide trend). As such, this is another 
important but often obscured factor to consider in the conversation about juvenile 
restitution and its impact: if already-employed youth must shift wages from family 
necessities to restitution programs, how does that impact their families? 
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proceedings).142 Further, true restorative justice actually can 
achieve the philosophical and emotional changes scholars hoped for 
restitution, as lessons of accountability and community 
interconnectedness are instilled through the restorative process.143 
Additionally, Hennepin County should consider supporting a 
program or stand-alone fund for juvenile restitution. Though a 
monetary fund would inevitably impose an additional expense on 
the county, having such a fund would ensure victims of crime 
receive their restitution without imposing an effectively unpayable 
debt upon children. This fund would not need to cover the full extent 
of a restitution order, but rather could be used to cover part of the 
court-mandated payment. After a court determines a justice-
involved youth’s ability to pay, any excess restitution outside of the 
child’s ability to pay could be taken from the fund. Similarly, if a 
statutory cap on restitution was imposed, any required restitution 
beyond the cap could be met using the fund. In these instances, so 
long as VOM or other face-to-face programs are also in place, the 
supposed benefits of restitution are still operational: young people 
who break the law are held accountable and forced to reckon with 
the harm they caused, yet this reckoning does not set them up for a 
lifetime of debt and a constricted future. 
Conclusion 
Although it is viewed as philosophically rehabilitative, 
Hennepin County courts interpret and implement juvenile 
restitution in a manner that often feels punitive. Justice-involved 
youth, who disproportionately come from low-income families, are 
saddled with restitution orders that are impractical—if not 
impossible—for them to pay. This debt follows them from youth into 
adulthood, molding their future successes and stresses. This Note 
suggests that this process is flawed: the purpose of our juvenile 
delinquency system is not to expose kids to the punitive measures 
employed during adult sentencing, but to treat children in a manner 
that recognizes them as children and acknowledges their capacity 
to change. 
For juvenile restitution to achieve these ends, it must weave 
community connections into payment orders (either through VOM, 
other mediation, or individualized community service projects). 
Perhaps more importantly, Minnesota courts must start 
interpreting the underlying restitution statutes (especially 
 
 142. Lucas, supra note 20, at 1375. 
 143. Ruback, supra note 12, at 1798. 
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Minnesota Statutes Section 260b.198) to give effect to all provisions 
in the statute, including the reasonableness and ability to pay 
requirements. 
